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THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN NINETEENTH
CENTURY AMERICA
On December 15,

189o,

Samuel D. Warren and Louis D.

Brandeis, two young Boston law partners, published an article
in the Harvard Law Review entitled The Right to Privacy.I
In that article, they proposed a remedy for invasions of personal privacy by the press. 2 More than ninety years later,
protection of privacy has become a major concern of the law.
Legal scholars have organized the extensive body of case law
into a coherent common law of privacy;3 the Supreme Court
has enshrined the right to privacy in the "penumbra" of the
Bill of Rights; 4 and Congress has enacted additional safeguards. 5
This increased recognition of a right to privacy has brought
corresponding praise for Warren and Brandeis as the originators of a new legal right. 6 At the same time, their contribution
has been criticized as having lacked sufficient legal 7 and factual8 basis for the right they are credited with launching. One
recent commentator surveyed the English precedents cited in
The Right to Privacy and concluded that "before 189o no court
had protected inviolate personality . . .or a right to privacy,

independent of property rights." 9 A more fundamental critique of privacy law in general attempts to reduce this "new"
right to its component interests and then to assess whether
these interests deserve legal protection.' 0 Finding some aspects
IWarren & Brandeis,

The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).

21Id. at 219.
3 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B-652E (1977); Prosser, Privacy,
48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (296o).
4 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 382 U.S. 479, 483-86 (1965).
sSee, e.g., Privacy Act of 2974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2976); Freedom of Information
Act of 1974, § 2(b), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (976) (privacy exception).
6 See, e.g., P. DIONISOPOULOS & C. DUCAT, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 20 (0976);
Prosser, supra note 3, at 383.
7 See, e.g., Pratt, The Warren and Brandeis Argument for a Right to Privacy,
1975 PUB. L. I61, 179.
' See, e.g., Barron, Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev.
193 (r89o): Demystifying a Landmark Citation, 13 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 875 (979).
9 Pratt, supra note 7, at I76. A similar criticism that property rights were the
only rights protected by injunctions in equity was advanced in Hadley, The Right to
Privacy, 3 Nw. L. REV. I, 3-4 (2894), and later recanted in Hadley, Can the
Publicationof a Libel Be Enjoined?, 4 Nw. L. REV. 137, 145-46 (1896).
10 See, e.g., Davis, What Do We Mean by "Right to Privacy"?, 4 S.D.L. REV. I
(1959); Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law - Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 326 (2966); Posner, Privacy, Secrecy, and Reputation, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. I (i979); Posner, The Right to Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393 (2978)
(economic analysis of the right of privacy).
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of privacy to be, for example, merely extensions of property

and reputation, the reductionist approach suggests that what
Warren and Brandeis invented did not constitute an independ-

ently protectible right."
Both praise and criticism proceed on the assumption,

shared by modern courts, 12 commentators,
4

13

and legal histo-

rians,1 that "courts had not prior to 189o granted relief expressly for invasion of [a] right of privacy." I s Warren and
Brandeis, however, deserve neither full credit nor blame for
the law's recognition of privacy as a protectible interest. They

did not purport to add a novel right to the legal universe, but
instead drew upon some of the established legal doctrines protecting personal privacy to propose an extension of remedies
against the press. 16 Readers of their article in i8go would

"

See, e.g., Davis, supra note io, at 7-i2; Kalven, supra note io, at 339-41.
12 See, e.g., Flores v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 N.Y.2d 276, 280, 164 N.E.2d 853,
854-55, i96 N.Y.S.2d 975, 978 (i959); Nader v. General Motors Corp., 31 A.D.2d
392, 397, 298 N.Y.S.2d 137, 143 (1969) (Steuer, J., dissenting) ("Prior to i89o, if the
phrase ['right of privacy'] was used at all it represented, at least logically, an amorphous concept somewhat in the nature of 'the pursuit of happiness', something to
which we had a right; but reducing that right to enforcible proportions was not even
imagined."), aff'd, 25 N.Y.2d 560, 255 N.E.2d 765, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647 (,97o); Billings
v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858, 859 (Tex. 1973).
13 See, e.g., A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 169 (1971) ("As the last
century drew to an end, it was relatively simple to evaluate the legal position of a
man whose privacy had been invaded - the doors of the courthouse were closed to
him." (footnote omitted)); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at
802 (4th ed. 1971); Davis, supra note io, at 3.
" See, e.g., L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 548 (1973); O'Connor,

The Right to Privacy in HistoricalPerspective, 53 MAss. L.Q. i1, io9-io (1968).
Among the first commentators to reject this assumption were Alan Westin and
David Flaherty. See D. FLAHERTY, PRIVACY IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 248
(1972) ("[A] right to privacy existed .. . that was both traditional and customary.');
A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 330-38 (1967). Recently, historians have begun
to concede the existence of some wider concern for privacy shortly before 189o. See
M. KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE 519-21 (1977); G. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA
173 (i980).

Is Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858, 859 (Tex. 2973).
16 Their article recognized that "the existing law afford[ed] a principle which may
be invoked to protect the privacy of the individual from invasion." Warren & Brandeis, supra note i, at 206. The "next step" they proposed was a small but difficult
one, extending this principle from its secure grounding to a direct confrontation with
a robust "yellow press" that jealously guarded its first amendment privileges. Id. at
i95; see Bloustein, Privacy, Tort Law, and the Constitution:Is Warren and Brandeis'
Tort Petty and Unconstitutionalas Well?, 46 TEX. L. REV. 6ii (1968). The authors
reasoned in part from contractual and equitable doctrines, Warren & Brandeis, supra
note I, at 207-13, but primarily from the law of intellectual property. Courts, in
preventing the publication of private letters, see p. igoo infra, had recognized a right
to "inviolate personality" or had at least strayed so far from conventional notions of
property that recognition of a property interest in personal information could logically
follow. Id. at 204-05. But see p. 19o4 infra.
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have recognized that the law already afforded
many explicit
17
protections against other invasions of privacy.
This Note examines the extent to which nineteenth century
American courts and legislatures recognized privacy as an independent interest. Part I sets out the legal doctrines protecting the home and the privacy associated with it. Part II deals
with the protection of confidential communication, which had
much less to do with conventional notions of property than
did the rights associated with the home. Part III describes
how information about individuals, information that was not
property at all, was protected by limiting access to public
records and preventing unwanted publications. The picture
that emerges by i8go is one of ample and explicit protection
of privacy in its own right.
I. PRIVATE PROPERTY

The legal maxim and popular proverb that "a man's house
is his castle" had wide application in the nineteenth century.18
American courts administered criminal penalties1 9 and civil
remedies to safeguard "the sanctity and inviolability of one's
house,"' 20 the householder's right to "quiet and peaceable possession," 2 1 and the dwellinghouse as "the place of family re17 For contemporary reviews of the Warren and Brandeis article that make this
point, see The Right to Privacy, 51 NATION 496 (i890); 17 LIFE 4 (189i) (brief
commentary); 9 SCRIBNER'S MAGAZINE 261 (i89i) (same).
s For examples of nonlegal appearances of the phrase, see A. TAYLOR & B.
WHITING,

A

DICTIONARY

OF AMERICAN

PROVERBS AND PROVERBIAL PHRASES,

i82o-I88o, at 193 (I958); B. WHITING, EARLY AMERICAN PROVERBS AND PROVERBIAL PHRASES 226-27 (i977). The principal English authority for the maxim is
Semayne's Case, 5 Co. Rep. gia, gib, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 95 (1605). An earlier
mention can be found in Y.B. Mich. 21 Hen. 7, f. 39, pl. 50 (1499), noted in 2 THE
REPORTS OF SIR JOHN SPELMAN3z6 & n.2 (94 Selden Society, J. Baker ed. 1978).
19On this basis, Sir William Blackstone justified the criminal punishment of
burglary, arson, nuisance, and eavesdropping, as well as the rule that sheriffs or
bailiffs could not break down doors for the execution of any civil process. 4 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *223 (The law has "so
particular and tender a regard to the immunity of a man's house that it stiles it his
castle, and will never suffer it to be violated with impunity."). American courts
echoed Blackstone's sentiments. See, e.g., Snydacker v. Brosse, 51 Ill. 357, 359-60
(i869) (no authority to break outer doors in the execution of civil process); Mitchell
v. Commonwealth, 88 Ky. 349, 353, 11 S.W. 209, 210 (1889) (dictum) (severe punishment for crimes against the "peculiar sanctity" of the dwelling-house) (superseded
on other grounds by KY. R. CRiM. PRoc. 6.12, 6.16, see Luna v. Commonwealth,
571 S.W.2d 88 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977), remanded, 574 S.W.2d 227 (Ky. 1978)); Armour
v. State, 22 Tenn. (3Hum.) 379, 384 (1842).
20 Christian v. State, 96 Ala. 89, 91, i So. 338, 338-39 (1892).
21 Foye v. Sewell, 2I Abb. N. Cas. 15, 17 (N.Y. Ct. C.P. 1888).
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pose. '"22 In particular, the law of trespass and the constitutional prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure were
interpreted as safeguards of privacy interests against official
and unofficial intrusion.
The ability to exclude others, a central feature of private
property, 23 was absolute when the family home was the property in question and domestic privacy the interest at stake.
Even the property rights of others yielded before the householder's "right of shutting his own door." 24 Landlords entering
to make repairs, 25 owners of goods seeking to retrieve them,2 6
27
and creditors sending sheriffs to execute valid judgments
could all be held liable for intrusion upon the repose and
tranquillity of families within the dwellinghouse." ' 28 Further,
a Vermont court upheld a houseguest's "right of quiet occupancy and privacy" against the unwelcome intrusion of her
host into the bedroom he had provided for her, 29 and a Michigan court found a sacred "right of privacy" violated when a
doctor brought an unqualified assistant into the bedchamber
of a woman in childbirth. 30 Whether the plaintiff was a property owner or a guest, and whether the defendant gained entry
by force or by false pretenses, the trespass remedy protected
domestic privacy. Moreover, damages in trespass were not
limited to the plaintiff's pecuniary loss, but included, in the
words of a New York court, compensation for "injury, insult,
invasion of the privacy, and 1interference with the comfort of
'3
the plaintiff and his family."
22 Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 88 Ky. 349, 353, 11 S.W. 209, 210 (1889) (emphasis
omitted) (superseded on other grounds by Ky. R. CraM. PROc. 6.12, 6.16, see Luna
v. Commonwealth, 571 S.W.2d 88 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977), remanded, 574 S.W.2d 227
(Ky. 1978)).
23 See 2 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *2.
24 State v. Armfield, 9 N.C. (2 Hawks) 246, 247 (1822).

25Wien v. Simpson, 2 Phila. 158, 158-59 (Pa. Dist. Ct. 1857).
26 See Hobbs v. Geiss, 13 Serg. & Rawl. 417, 418-19 (Pa. 1826). But see Keith
v. Johnson, 31 Ky. (i Dana) 604, 605 (1833) (statute permitted forcible entry to
recover a slave adjudged to belong to the plaintiff).
27 See, e.g., flsley v. Nichols, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 270, 277 (1832) (deputy sheriff
making attachment of goods); Oystead v. Shed, 13 Mass. 520, 523 (1816) (deputy
sheriff making arrest); State v. Armfield, 9 N.C. (2 Hawks) 246, 247 (1822) (constable
executing civil process).
25 Oystead v. Shed, 13 Mass. 520, 523 (186).

29 Newell v. Whitcher, 53 Vt. 589, 592 (1880). The concern of the court may
have been to avenge the honor of a defenseless woman, but the language of privacy
protection provided the legal rationale for recovery.
30 De May v. Roberts, 46 Mich. 16o, x65-66, 9 N.W. 146, 249 (1881).
31 Ives v. Humphrey, i E.D. Smith 296, 201-02 (N.Y. Ct. C.P. 1851) (emphasis
omitted).
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Invasions of domestic privacy that fell short of physical
trespass were dealt with by the criminal law. Eavesdropping,
a common law crime noted by Blackstone, 3 2 was prosecuted
in America on the ground that "no man has a right . . . to
pry into your secrecy in your own house." 33 Although never
numerous, indictments for eavesdropping occurred throughout
the nineteenth century under common law and statute. 34 In
addition, "peeping Toms" could be punished under state statutes and city ordinances. 35 These sanctions against curious
eyes and ears augmented the trespass remedy, giving householders a right to be free from unwanted observation from
without. In 1892, trespass itself was extended to this type of
conduct by the New York Court of Appeals. The court
awarded damages for "loss of privacy" to a plaintiff whose
rooms were exposed to observation when the defendant constructed an elevated train platform. 36 By the late nineteenth
century, the law had erected high walls around the family
home by extending criminal penalties for and civil remedies
against intrusion by strangers.
Official intrusions into the home were also narrowly restricted in the interest of privacy. In i791, with colonial writs
of assistance and general warrants an all-too-recent memory,
the independent states added the fourth amendment to the
federal Constitution, preserving the "right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects" from warrantless search and seizure by agents of the new national
government. 37 Thomas Cooley, a leading constitutional authority, linked the fourth amendment to the common law principle that "a man's house is his castle," a guarantee of the
citizen's "immunity in his home against the prying eyes of the
32

4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note

19,

at *169 (defining the offense as "listen[ing]

under walls or windows, or the eaves of a house, to hearken after discourse, and
thereupon to frame slanderous and mischievous tales").
33 Commonwealth v. Lovett, 6 Pa. L.J.R. 226, 227 (1831); see id. at 228 (discussing
Commonwealth v. Mengelt, unpublished Pennsylvania decision of 8x18); State v.
Pennington, 4o Tenn. (3 Head) 299 (1859); State v. Williams, 2 Tenn. (2 Overt,) xo8
(18o8).
34 See State v. Davis, 139 N.C. 547, 547-48, 5, S.E. 897, 897 (19o5); N.Y. PEN.
CODE § 436 (i881); Indictedfor Eavesdropping, 9 CRIM. L. MAGAZINE 941 (1887).
35 City of Grand Rapids v. Williams, I12 Mich. 247, 250, 70 N.W. 547, 547-48
(1897) (violation of ordinance against "indecent, insulting, or immoral conduct").
36 Moore v. New York Elevated R.R., 13o N.Y. 523, 527-28, 29 N.E. 997,
997-98 (1892). The court here grounded the action on continuing trespass in the
nature of a loss of easement.
37 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See generally N. LAsSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

(1937).
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Each state adopted a parallel provision in its

own constitution, 39 and much early development of search and

seizure doctrine took place in state courts. 40 As a state judge,
Cooley interpreted Michigan's search and seizure provision "to
make sacred the privacy of the citizen's dwelling and person

against everything but' 41process issued upon a showing of legal
cause for invading it."

Boyd v. United States,4 2 one of the first Supreme Court
a
decisions to interpret the fourth amendment, 43 expressed 44
safeguard.

similar view of the purpose of this constitutional

4S
Relying on the English precedent of Entick v. Carrington,

the Court recognized an "indefeasible right of personal secu38 The earliest appearances of a search and seizure provision in state constitutions
are collected in Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 16o n.5 (I947) (Frankfurter,
J.,dissenting), overruled, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (2969). New York, the
only state Justice Frankfurter omits, enacted such a provision in a 1787 "Bill of
Rights." See Hitchcock, The Inviolability of Telegrams, 2 PROc. A.B.A. 93, I2O n.*
(X879).
39 See, e.g., Larthet v. Forgay, 2 La. Ann. 524, 525-26 (1847) (constitutional
protection of "the domestic repose of the citizen" permitted recovery for "injury to the
plaintiff's feelings, and the disturbance of his family" caused by entrance without a
valid warrant); Bell v. Clapp, io Johns. 263, 264-65 (N.Y. 1813). See generally A.
WESTIN, supra note 14, at 333.
40 T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 299-300 (Bos-

ton I868). This language was adopted by a federal court in United States v. Three
Tons of Coal, 28 F. Cas. 149, I5i (E.D. Wis. 1875). See also I F. LIEBER, ON
CIVIL LIBERTY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT 46 (Philadelphia 1853) (fourth amendment
guarantee of "individual security" against "police government"); H. VON HOLST, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAwv OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 257 (A. Mason trans.

1887) (fourth amendment protection against "arbitrary acts of the public power").
Outside the ambit of criminal prosecution, protections of the castle were invoked
against censustakers. Trials of the Census-Taker, N.Y. Times, July ig, 1875, at 4,
col. 4. Members of Congress were even reluctant to permit entry into homes by the
District of Columbia water board. See io CONG. REC. 3170 (288o) (remarks of Sen.
Ingalls).
41 Weimer v. Bunbury, 30 Mich. 201, 208 (1874).

42 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (holding unconstitutional a statute compelling production
of private papers).
43Boyd and Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878), discussed at pp. i899-9oo
infra, provided the first substantial opportunities for the Court to develop a fourth
amendment jurisprudence. See Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally
Protected Privacy under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARV. L. REV. 945,
952 n.42 (1977).
44
See L. BETH, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, 18771917, at 200-01 (1971). The Boyd Court's broad interpretation of the scope of the

fourth and fifth amendments, see pp. i899-goo, 1903 infra, has not been equalled in
the 2oth century. See United States v. Abrams, 615 F.2d 541, 547 (ist Cir. I98O)
(stating that Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), "wounded Boyd mortally");
Note, supra note 43.
4S ig How. St. Tr. 1029 (C.P. 1765).
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rity, personal liberty and private property" 46 against "all invasions on the part of the government and its employ~s of the
' 47
sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life."
Although judicial protection of privacy was substantial,
resort to the courts was not the first line of defense for the
homeowner faced with official or unofficial intrusion. The
principal means of protecting privacy subsumed under the
maxim "a man's house is his castle" was the willingness of
nineteenth century Americans to resort to force - quite often
deadly force - in the defense of their homes. The acquittal
of one vehement householder in 189o received national attention:
"A man's house is his castle"; in it he is supposed to be safe;
privacy is sacred in the eyes of civilization, and no individual
has the right to violate the privacy of another; ergo, has not
the right to enter his house without his consent for any purpose whatsoever ....
The courts have so decided, and a
fresh decision by Judge Collins has brought to notice the
danger of violation of the principle: "A man's house is his
castle." Officer John Mahoney went to the house of Thomas
Bailey, and, without warrant, forcibly entered. Bailey shot
him, as he had a perfect right to do, and the court acquitted
him. Any citizen has a right to defend his privacy to whatever
extent he may find necessary, save against recognized and
accredited officers of the law with the official order of the
community in the shape of a warrant to justify their intru48
sion.
Among the available legal remedies for invasion of domestic
privacy must be counted the law's provision for this extraordinary measure of individual self-help. In court, defense of
the castle may have had its limits, but in public opinion it was
an absolute right.

46 IX6 U.S. at 630. justice Bradley echoed the words of Joseph Story who, in his
treatise on the Constitution, declared the fourth amendment's protections to be "indispensable to the full enjoyment of the rights of personal security, personal liberty,
and private property." 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES § I895, at 748 (Boston 1833).

For an adoption of Justice Story's

extrajudicial pronouncement by a state court, see Larthet v. Forgay, 2 La. Ann. 524,
V16 (1847).

47 II6 U.S. at 630. This language reappeared in ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447,
479 (1894) (Harlan, J.).
48 A Man's House His Castle, 9 PUB. OPINION 342 (x8go) (reprinted from Chicago
Mail).
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CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS

Nineteenth century public opinion regarded the "sanctity
of the mails" as absolute in the same way it esteemed the
inviolability of the home. 49 A special agent of the Post Office
explained in 1855 that "[t]he laws of the land are intended not
only to preserve the person and material property of every
citizen sacred from intrusion, but to secure the privacy of his
thoughts, so far as he sees fit to withhold them from others." 5 0
Legal protection of private letters and other confidential communications from interception, publication, and forced disclosure depended on notions of personal privacy often unattached
to any property interest.
Although a letter was considered the property of the sender
while in transit, unauthorized opening and reading of its contents was neither theft nor damage to property. Congress
nevertheless made interception intended "to pry into another's
business or secrets" a criminal offense. 5 1 Whether this or any
other prohibition prevented the federal government, acting
officially, from opening sealed letters in the custody of its post
office was unsettled5 2 until 1878. In Ex parte Jackson,5 3 the
Supreme Court held that a statute banning lottery information
from the mails could not be enforced by federal officers' opening letters and sealed packages, unless upon the authority of
49 See, e.g., F. CURRIER, POSTAL COMMUNICATION, PAST AND PRESENT 3-4
(1894) (quoting remarks of Ralph Waldo Emerson); i F. LIEBER, supra note 40, at
io9 ("the sacredness of epistolary communion'); Lotteries and Letters, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 23, 1858, at 4, col. 3.
5o J. HOLBROox, TEN YEARS AMONG THE MAIL BAGS xviii (Philadelphia I855).
51 Act of Mar. 3, 1825, ch. 64, § 22, 4 Stat. 102 (penalty against any person
opening letters en route) (believed to have been drafted chiefly by Daniel Webster, see
5 CONG. REc. 444 (1877) (remarks of Sen. Conkling)); see Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch.
7, § i6, i Stat. 232 (penalty against postal employees who "unlawfully" opened,
delayed, or detained the mails). Similar provisions had been enacted by the Continental Congress, 21 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 67,
(W. Ford ed. 1782). For state cases involving accusations of letter opening, see
Hillhouse v. Peck, 2 Stew. & P. 395, 395 (Ala. 1832); McCuen v. Ludlum, I7 N.J.
L. 12 (x839).
52
See D. WELLS, THE RELATION OF THE GOVERNMENT TO THE TELEGRAPH

49-50 (1873). In the i 9 th century, the government itself opened private correspondence only on rare occasions and for specific purposes: (i) the protection of military
secrets, see J. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 500 (1926);
Cf. 5 CONG. REC. 350 (1876) (remarks of Rep. Kasson) (the degree of wartime censorship was later minimized); (2) the prevention of fraud, see Ex parte Jackson, 96
U.S. 727 (1878); Lotteries and Letters, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1858, at 4, col. 3; (3)
the eradication of obscene literature, see Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 89, § i6, 13 Stat.
504; CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 66o-62 (1865) (debate); Suppression of
Obscene Literature, N.Y. Times, July 3, 1873, at 8, col. 2.
53 96 U.S. 727 (1878).
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a warrant issued in compliance with the fourth amendment.5 4
"The constitutional guaranty," wrote Justice Field, "of the
right of the people to be secure in their papers against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers, thus
closed against inspection, wherever they may be."' ' This decision, coupled with a statutory mandate that postal officials
not detain or delay letters,5 6 ensured
virtually absolute protec57
tion against official tampering.
The privacy of letters once delivered was protected by state
law. Criminal penalties for "the violation of epistolary correspondence" were proposed 8 and enacted5 9 in some jurisdictions. In addition, courts of equity would issue injunctions to
prevent publication of private letters contrary to the sender's
wishes. Despite some early doubts, 60 American courts, led by
Justice Joseph Story, 6 1 refused to limit this relief to letters of
"literary merit" in which the sender might have a pecuniary
or proprietary interest.62
When produced in court, letters again received special
treatment. According to one description of late nineteenth
century practice, letters were handed quietly to the judge, who
read them privately and without disclosure to the parties or to
the jury, "unless they be of that nature falling within the
restrictions of the law which commits them to the record as
evidence in the case." ' 6 3 What was not relevant or material,
S4 Id. at 735; cf. Coltzhausen v. Nazro, 1O7 U.S. 215 (1883) (opening of sealed
letter does not render customs agent liable).
ss 96 U.S. at 733.
56 Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, § 16, i Stat. 232.
57 See U.S. POST OFFICE DEP'T, POSTAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS § 5o6 (1887)
("the absolute sanctity of the seal" could not be broken, even to furnish evidence of
criminal matters).
58 Edward Livingston, an early reformer and codifier of the criminal law, proposed
fines and imprisonment for unauthorized opening, malicious publication, and taking
of private letters. Draft Code of Crimes and Punishments art. 621 (1824), reprinted
in 2 E. LIVINGSTON, COMPLETE WORKS I66 (1873); see I id. at 322.
s9 See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 6t8 (1872).
60 See Hoyt v. Mackenzie, 3 Barb. Ch. 320, 324-25 (N.Y. Ch. z848); Wetmore
v. Scovell, 3 Edw. Ch. 515, 527-28 (N.Y. Ch. 1842).
61 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 346 (C.C.D. Mass. x841) (Story, J.); 2 J.
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 944-949 (Boston 1836).
62 See Rice v. Williams, 32 F. 437, 439 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 2887) (sale of letters
relating to medical afflictions was "grossly disreputable business"); Folsom v. Marsh,
9 F. Cas. 342, 346 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841); Denis v. Leclerc, i Mart. 297, 313 (Terr.
Orleans i8ii); Woolsey v. Judd, 4 Duer 379, 406, ii How. Pr. 49, 78 (N.Y. Super.
Ct. 1855); Dock v. Dock, i8o Pa. 14, 22, 36 A. 411, 412 (1897); cf. Eyre v. Higbee,
22 How. Pr. 198 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. i86i) (personal and business letters in hands of
executor are not assets subject to sale).
63 5 CONG. REc. 444 (1877) (remarks of Sen. Conkling).
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and especially. what might be "injurious to 64the feelings or
interest of third persons," was left unrevealed.
The telegraph posed additional problems of privacy protection because messages were necessarily read by the operators who sent and received them. Wiretapping, a practice
learned by military telegraphers during the Civil War, 65 was
made a crime in some states; 66 elsewhere it was effectively
prohibited by laws against interference with telegraph company property. 67 Disclosure by employees, including operators

and those with access to messages retained in office files, was
prohibited by company rules 68 and by statute in nearly every

state. 69 According to one early judicial interpretation, these
laws were intended "to prevent the betrayal of private affairs
. . . for the promotion of private gain or the gratification of
' 70
idle gossip."

Whether such statutes also prevented government investigators from demanding the production of telegrams was much

debated. 7 1 Western Union firmly opposed and resisted legislative as well as judicial subpoenas,7

2

and newspapers char-

acterized congressional dragnet subpoenas of telegraph office

files as "unconstitutional and indecent."173 Debate over the

privacy of the telegraph reached its height in the aftermath of
6Id;

I S.

GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 253 (Boston

1842)
(emphasis omitted).
65

See S. DASH, R. SCHVARTz & R. KNOWLTON, THE EAVESDROPPERS

23

(1959).

See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 640 (1872); 1895 Ill. Laws 157.
67 See, e.g., 1868 Me. Laws 97; Rosenzweig, The Law of Wire Tapping, 33
CORNELL L.Q. 73, 73 (1947); Westin, The Wire-Tapping Problem: An Analysis and
a Legislative Proposal,52 COLUM. L. REv. 165, 182-83 (1952).
68 See, e.g., WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH Co., RULES, REGULATIONS, AND INSTRUCTIONS no. 128, at 55 (Cleveland i866).
69 Statutes are cited in M. GRAY, A TREATISE ON COMMUNICATION BY TELE66

GRAPH § 120, at 213 nn.i-3 (1885); Hitchcock, supra note 38, at 114-19.
70 Henisler v. Freedman, 2 Pars. Eq. Cas. 274 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1851).
71 As an emergency war measure in 1861, President Lincoln's War Office seized

files of telegrams in all the major cities. See A. HARLOW, OLD WIRES AND NEW
WAVES 264-65 (1936); 1 W. PLUM, THE MILITARY TELEGRAPH DURING THE CIVIL
WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 69 (1882); cf. D. BATES, LINCOLN IN THE TELEGRAPH

OFFICE 235-36 (1907) (privacy protest of a New York City office manager in 2864).
After the war, the Reconstruction Congress took the initiative, issuing dragnet
subpoenas of telegraph company files to fuel its investigative activities. See, e.g.,
CONG. GLOBE, 4oth Cong., 2d Sess. supp., at 89-92 (i868) (impeachment trial of
Andrew Johnson); 4 CONG. REC. pt. 7, at 216 (1876) (impeachment trial of William
Belknap).
72 In 1873, Western Union ordered employees not to comply with subpoenas for
telegraph messages in the company's possession. Exec. Order No. 147 (1873), reprinted in 5 CONG. REC. 453 (2877).
73 Washington -Secrets
of the Telegraph, N.Y. Times, June 24, 1876, at 4, col.
7; see Glover's Raidfor Telegrams, N.Y. Tribune, Dec. 20, 1876, at 1, col. 2.
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the contested presidential election of I876.74 Judge Cooley
again took a strongly protective stance, favoring judicial recognition of the absolute "inviolability" of telegraphic correspondence. 75 Western Union pressed for specific legislation
76
affording telegrams the same protection as letters in the mail.
Ultimately the issue was settled by the courts, which required
that subpoenas specify the date and subject of the particular
telegrams sought. 77 Dragnet searches of the files, whether by
legislative
or by judicial authority, would no longer be toler78
ated.
Other private conversations and sensitive items of personal
information were also protected from disclosure in courtroom
testimony and in official records of legal proceedings. 7 9 The
common law rule of evidence that excluded spousal testimony
and confidential communications between husband and wife,
though rooted in antiquated notions of the couple's single legal
identity, 80 acquired a new justification in the nineteenth cen81
tury: preserving "the sacred privacy of domestic life."
74 Opponents of the subpoenas in Congress invoked the "rights of private citizens,"
5 CONG. REc. 327 (1876) (remarks of Rep. McCrary), to "intrust their most sacredly
private affairs to the telegraph compan[y] under the seal of its confidence," id. at
328-29 (remarks of Rep. Garfield), against "the invasion of their privacy by their
servants, the House of Representatives," id. at 328; see id. at 326 (remarks of Rep.
Hurd); id. at 442 (1877) (remarks of Sen. Sherman). See also A. Westin, Privacy and
American Law: The Search for Lost Doctrine in the Computer Age 64-70 (1965)
(unpublished manuscript in the Harvard Law School Library).
75 Cooley, Inviolability of Telegraphic Correspondence, i8 AM. L. REG. (n.s.) 65
(1879); see T. COOLEY, supra note 40, at 375 n.2 (4 th ed. 1878); cf. Hitchcock, supra
note 38, at 140 (advocating a legislative solution).
76 H.R. 5101, 4 6th Cong., 2d Sess. (188o), reprinted in N.Y. Tribune, Jan. ii,
188o, at 5, col. 3.
77 See, e.g., United States v. Babcock, 24 F. Cas. 908, 909 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1876);
United States v. Hunter, IS F. 712, 714-15 (N.D. Miss. 1882); Ex parte Jaynes, 70
Cal. 638, 639, 12 P. 117, 117 (i886); Ex parle Brown, 72 Mo. 83, 94-95 (188o);
Henisler v. Freedman, 2 Pars. Eq. Cas. 274 (Pa. Ct. C.P. I85I); cf. State v. Litchfield,
58 Me. 267 (1870) (operator may testify to specific message in criminal proceeding);
National Bank v. National Bank, 7 W. Va. 544 (1874) (specific telegrams not privileged in civil proceeding).
78 On the general limitations imposed on legislative investigations, see Kilbourn v.
Thompson, IO3 U.S. i68, 195 (188o); In re Pacific Ry. Comm'n, 32 F. 241, 250
(C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887).
79The privacy of jury deliberations was protected in Rickard v. State, 74 Ind.
275, 277 (i88i); People v. Knapp, 42 Mich. 267, 270-71, 3 N.W. 927, 929 (x879).
80 See i E. COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF
ENGLAND 6b (London 628). The changing rationales of the rules are discussed in
8 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF EVIDENCE §§ 2228, 2332-2333 (rev.
ed. J. McNaughton 1961).
81 Johnson v. State, 63 Miss. 313, 317 (1885); see Collins v. Mack, 31 Ark. 684,
689 (1877); Stanford v. Murphy, 63 Ga. 410, 416 (1879); People v. Hayes, 14o N.Y.

484, 495-96, 35 N.E. 951, 954 (1894).
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Courts went far to avoid "embarrassing questions" that would
"tear . . . away the veil, which hides from public gaze the
sacred confidences which subsist between husband and
wife."' 8 2 The value of confidentiality was emphasized again in
8 3
the common law privilege for attorney-client communications
and in nineteenth century extension of similar protection to
disclosures from patient to doctor8 4 and from penitent to
85
priest.

Nineteenth century jurisprudence also recognized a privacy
component in the fifth amendment safeguard against self-in-

crimination. 86 Until the close of the century, "incrimination"
was read broadly to include "infamy and disgrace" in addition

to liability to criminal prosecution. 87 One purpose of the
amendment, it was argued, was to avoid "compel[ling] a man

who has fought his way from obscurity to dignity and honor
to reveal crimes of which he had repented and of which the

world was ignorant."' 88 It prevented the compulsory production of personal papers8 9 and permitted defendants to refuse
to act, speak, or wear clothing for purposes of courtroom

identification. 90
Further constitutional underpinning for the privacy of communications was sought by nineteenth century jurists in the

82 Owen v. State, 78 Ala. 425, 429-30 (1885); see Kelley v. Proctor, 41 N.H. 139,
141, 144 (186o).
83 See, e.g., Denver Tramway Co. v. Owens, 20 Colo. 107, 36 P. 848 (1894);
Wheeler v. Hill, 16 Me. 329, 333 (1839); Hatton v. Robinson, 32 Mass. (14 Pick.)
416, 422 (I833).
4 See, e.g., Masonic Mutual Benefit Ass'n v. Beck, 77 Ind. 203, 209-1o (i881);
Edington v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 67 N.Y.I85, 194 (1876); 2 N.Y. REv. STATS. pt.
3., ch. 7, tit. 3, art. 9, § 73 (x828).
's See i E. LMNGSTON, supra note 58, at 467-68.
86 The connection was recognized in a case involving the marital privilege: "It
would be as wrong to make them reveal their private conversations, as admissions
against interest, as it would be to charge them with their thoughts." Sumner v.

Cooke, 51 Ala. 521, 521 (1874).
87 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 636-37 (1896) (Field, J., dissenting); United
States v. James, 60 F. 257, 26o-61, 265 (N.D. Ill. 1894); Ex parte Rowe, 7 Cal. 184
(1857); Zanone v. State, 97 Tenn. io, 118, 36 S.W. 711, 715 (1896), overruled, State
v. Morgan, 541 S.W.2d 385 (Tenn. 1976); Carroll v. State, 32 Tex. Crim. 431, 24
S.W. ioo (1893); Kendrick v. Commonwealth, 78 Va. 490 (1884). See generally 3 A
J. WIGMORE, supra note 80, §§ 984, 986-987 (rev. ed. J. Chadbourn 1976).
88Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 632 (1896) (Field, J., dissenting).
89 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (holding unconstitutional a statute

compelling production of private papers).
90 See, e.g., Cooper v. State, 86 Ala. 61o, 61l-12, 6 So. iio, iii (1888), overrded,
Hubbard v. State, 283 Ala. 183, 215 So. 2d 261 (1968), vacated on other grounds,
408 U.S. 934 (1972); People v. McCoy, 45 How. Pr. 216, 217 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1873);
Stokes v. State, 64 Tenn. 61g, 621 (1875).
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"freedom of communion" guaranteed by the first amendment.9 1
The "chilling effect" of public disclosure on private expression
was best explained by Justice Story. The publication of private letters
strikes at the root of all that free and mutual interchange of
advice, opinions, and sentiments, between relatives and
friends, and correspondents, which is so essential to the wellbeing of society, and to the spirit of a liberal courtesy and
refinement. It may involve whole families in great distress,
from the public display of facts and circumstances, which
were reposed in the bosoms of others under the deepest and
most affecting confidence, that they should forever remain
inviolable secrets. It may do more; and compel every one, in
self-defence, to write, even to his dearest friends, with the
cold and formal severity, with which he would write
to his
92
wariest opponents, or his most implacable enemies.
The law's protection of confidential communications from interception, publication, and compulsory disclosure served to
preserve the privacy without which free interchange was considered impossible.
liI. PERSONAL INFORMATION

"Mind your own business" was an eleventh commandment
in nineteenth century America. 9 3 Toward the end of the century, however, more and more of people's personal "business"
found its way into public records and into the gossip columns
of an enterprising "yellow press." 94 Although common law
doctrines protecting property and reputation often failed to
prevent unwanted disclosure, personal information did not go
unprotected. Courts and legislatures both restricted access to
information that individuals were required to supply to the
government and applied broad civil and criminal libel remedies
against the press.
The first United States census in 1790 sought little more
than the constitutionally required enumeration of persons,
slave and free. 95 Decade by decade, the scope of inquiry
91 Hitchcock, supra note 38, at 139. See also i F. LIEBER, supra note 40, at Iog.
92 2 J. STORY, supra note 6I, § 946.
93 See A. TAYLOR & B. WHITING, supra note 18, at 49. See also B. WHITING,
supra
note iS, at 5i.
94
See D. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE 168-73
(1973); D. PEMBER, PRIVACY AND THE PRESS 10-I5 (1972).
95 U.S. CONST. art. i, § 2, cl.
3. Even so, the first enumeration was opposed on
privacy grounds. i ANNALS OF CONG. 1107-o8 (J.Gales ed. 1790) (remarks of Reps.

Livermore and Page); see Merriam, The Evolution of American Census-Taking, 65
CENTURY 831, 834 (1903).
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increased to encompass physical and mental defects, national
origin, literacy, value of real property, and a number of other
details. 9 6 Citizens' concerns about the privacy of their returns
increased apace, 97 and, beginning in 1840, instructions to census takers ordered that individual returns be treated as confidential. 98 Congressman James A. Garfield, the principal advocate of a statutory penalty for disclosure of census data,
feared that "[tihe citizen is not adequately protected from the
danger, or rather the apprehension, that his private affairs,
the secrets of his family and his business, will be disclosed to
his neighbors" or, at the central office, be "made the quarry
of bookmakers and pamphleteers." 99 In 1889, a penalty for
such disclosure was enacted.1 0 0
Even with guarantees of confidentiality, there were subjects
about which Americans felt the government had no right to
ask. For example, new questions about secret diseases and
home mortgages were added to the census schedule in i89o,
arousing a storm of public protest that such questions were
impertinent, illegal, and unconstitutional.1 0 1 Lawyers as eminent as David Dudley Field took to the national press, advising citizens not to answer.10 2 The Superintendent of the Census prudently determined not to prosecute those who followed
such advice, 10 3 but a large number refused to give any census
96 See C. WRIGHT

& W.

HUNT, THE HISTORY AND GROWTH OF THE UNITED

STATES CENSUS 85 (19OO).
97
See, e.g., LETTERS ADDRESSED TO THE HON. JOHN DAVIS, S. Misc. Doc. No.
64, 3oth Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22 (1849).
9' See C. WRIGHT & W. HUNT, supra note 96, at 145, 15o; Davis, Confidentiality
and the Census, z79o-1929, in U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE,
RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS 178, 187 (1973). In 187o the
instructions read: "No graver offense can be committed by Assistant Marshals than
to divulge information acquired in the discharge of their duty. All disclosures should
be treated as strictly confidential ....
The Department is determined to protect the
citizen in all his rights in the present Census." CENSUS OFFICE, DEP'T OF THE
INTERIOR, INSTRUCTIONS TO ASSISTANT MARSHALS 7 (1870).
99 HOUSE COMM. ON THE NINTH CENSUS, NINTH CENSUS, H.R. REP. No. 3,
41st Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1870); Garfield, The American Census, 2 J. Soc. ScI. 31, 42
(1870).
100 Act of Mar. I, 1889, ch. 319, §§ 8, 13, 25 Stat. 760 ($500 fine for enumerators);

see Davis, supra note 98, at 178. For an investigation of offenses under the Act, see
H.R. REP. No. 1933, 52d Cong., ist Sess. 122, 125 (1892).
"o, See, e.g., 21 CONG. REc. 5158 (189o) (resolution introduced by Rep. McAdoo).
102 Letter from David Dudley Field (May 29, i8go), in 70 FRANK LESLIE'S ILLUSTRATED NEWSPAPER 395 (i8g0); see Atlanta
2; New Orleans Daily Picayune, June 5, i89o,
1890, at 4, col. 3.
103 See Boston Evening Transcript, June 2,
28, i89o, at 4, col. 4. The penalty for refusing
United States v. Moriarity, io6 F. 886,. 891-92

Const., May 30, i89o, at 4, cols. Iat 4, col. 4; N.Y. Times, May 26,
i89o, at 4, col. I; Wash. Post, May
to answer was upheld by the courts.
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. goi); United States
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information whatsoever. 10 4 For the time being, the federal
government had reached the limit of its inquiry; hidden diseases and debts joined political party and religious
affiliation
10 5
as subjects effectively barred from direct inquiry.
"[T]he 'natural and inalienable right' of everybody to keep
his affairs to himself"' 1 6 was also asserted in opposition to
other recordkeeping enterprises begun in the late nineteenth
century.1 0 7 Records of individual financial affairs, required
for collection of the Civil War income tax, were initially kept
confidential,1 0 8 but so much revenue was lost through fraud
and evasion that later legislation threw open the assessors'
returns to the newspapers.' 0 9 This public disclosure engendered sufficient hostility to kill the tax and, later, to prevent
any attempt to reinstitute it."1 0 Local records of land titles
were open for inspection, but many state courts required that
those inspecting titles have an "interest" in the particular piece
of property."' Inquiries motivated by "idle curiosity" were
v. Sarle, 45 F. 191, 193 (C.C.D.R.I. 18gi). But cf. United States v. Mitchell, 58 F.
993, 999 (N.D. Ohio 1893) (if a census required disclosure of trade secrets, "it may
be equivalent to the appropriation of private property").
104 See Chicago Tribune, June 4, 18go, at i, col. 5; N.Y. Times, June 1, 189o,
at 12, cols. 1-2.
105 On nineteenth century American sensitivity about medical examination, see
Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, I41 U.S. 250, 252 (1891) (compulsory surgical examination invades "inviolability of the person").
106 The Way It Ought Not to Be Collected, 9 NATION 453, 453 (I869).
107 Charitable organizations began to keep central records of their recipients in
what was called from the outset a "confidential exchange." F. BRUNO, TRENDS IN
SOCIAL WORK, 1874-1956, at lo5 (1957). Even prison officials opposed "marking
men" by copious records, lest "our penal institutions would become nothing more than
Pinkerton

detectives."

NATIONAL

PRISON ASS'N,

PROCEEDINGS

OF THE ANNUAL

1890, at 65 (1891).

The communications of an early credit reporting
agency were found "grossly libellous" in Muetze v. Tuteur, 77 Wis. 236, 244, 246, 46
N.W. 123, 125, 126 (I89O), overruled on other grounds, Judevine v. Benzies-Montanye
Fuel & Warehouse Co., 222 Wis. 512, 269 N.W. 295 (1936), overruled on other
grounds, Martin v. Outboard Marine Corp., 15 Wis. 2d 452, 113 N.W.2d 135 (1962).
10' See Howe, The Federal Revenues and the Income Tax, 4 ANNALS 64, 71
(1894).
109 See id. at 74-75; The Way It Ought Not to Be Collected, 9 NATION 453 (1869).
CONGRESS,

110 See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 2937 (1870) (remarks of Rep. Wood)

("[I]nconsistent with the personal liberty of the citizen," the tax "authorizes the assessor
to intrude into the household, the private business affairs, the domestic relations of
every individual."); id. at 3994-95 (remarks of Reps. Kelley and Butler); id. at
4031-32 (remarks of Rep. Davis); Howe, supra note lO8, at 75.
"I Webber v. Townley, 43 Mich. 534, 537, 5 N.W. 971, 972 (188o). Courts were

beginning to require a similar showing before allowing stockholders to examine corporate records. See People ex rel. Field v. Northern Pac. R.R., 5o N.Y. Super. Ct.
(18 Jones & Spen.) 456, 459-6o (1884); Phoenix Iron Co. v. Commonwealth ex rel.
Sellers, 113 Pa. 563, 572, 6 A. 75, 79 (1886).
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not permitted, 112 lest inspection, copying, and possible later
publication "make unnecessarily public men's private affairs,
which the law, for the purposes of fairness, requires them to
put upon record.""13 Thus, as more and more personal and
financial information was required by expanding government
enterprises, courts and legislatures demanded greater confidentiality from recordkeepers and attempted to limit the access of
others to such information.
The law of libel governed disclosure of information about
individuals to the public at large. In theory, invasion of privacy by the press could be distinguished from defamation; in
a civil action for libel, the truth of the matter published was
a complete defense,' 1 4 but the sting of an invasion of privacy
was precisely that the personal information published was
true. 1 5- In practice, however, courts effectively extended the
civil libel remedy to substantially true accounts by insisting on
the exact truth of every detail of information published 1 6 and
on publication of the "whole truth." 117 The damages a successful plaintiff recovered could include compensation for
emotional distress as well as for loss of reputation. 118 As long
as a newspaper account contained some inaccuracies or omissions, both loss of privacy and loss of reputation could be
remedied by a libel suit.
Nineteenth century Americans fiercely resented attack and
exposure by the press. A publication so outrageous or offensive that it incited breaches of the peace could be prosecuted
112 Randolph v. State ex rel. Collier, Pinckard & Gruber, 82 Ala. 527, 529, 2 So.
714, 716 (1887) ("idle curiosity"); Buck v. Collins, 5i Ga. 391, 397 (,874); Cormack

v. Wolcott, 37 Kan. 391, 397, 15 P. 245, 247 (1887).
113 Buck v. Collins, 51 Ga. 39', 397 (1874).
114 See 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note ig, at *126; W. PROSSER, supra note 13,

§ ii6, at 796-97.
'Is But see Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 431-32
& n.33 (1980).
116 See, e.g., Sharpe v. Stephenson, 34 N.C. (12 Ired.) 348, 350 (i851).
117 See, e.g., McAllister v. Detroit Free Press Co., 76 Mich. 338, 354, 43 N.W.

431, 437 (1889) (highly colorful report of an arrest held libelous when the suspect had
been discharged before it was published). In reaching its conclusion the Michigan
Supreme Court added:
[Tihe reporter of a newspaper has no more right to collect the stories on the
street, or even to gather information from policemen or magistrates out of
court, about a citizen, and to his detriment, and publish such stories and
information as facts in a newspaper, than has a person not connected with a
newspaper to whisper from ear to ear the gossip and scandal of the street.
Id. at 356, 43 N.W. at 437.
1s See Adams v. Smith, 58 li. 417 (187i); cf. Terwilliger v. Wands, 17 N.Y. 54
(858) (damage other than mental distress required).
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as a criminal libel. 119 The truth of the matter published was
no bar to such prosecution; indeed, the maxim was "the greater
the truth, the greater the libel."' 120 At first, criminal prosecutions for this offense did not even allow evidence of the
truth to be offered. 12 1 Even when the states by statute and
12 2
constitutional provision allowed such evidence to be given,
truth was still not a complete defense unless published "with
good motives and for justifiable ends."' 12 3 "Indeed," said a
Louisiana court, permitting truth as an absolute defense
"would be a barbarous doctrine which would grant to the evildisposed the liberty of ransacking the lives of others to drag
forth and expose follies, faults or crimes long since forgotten,
expiated by years of remorse and sincere reand perhaps
24
form." 1

Although available to victims of privacy invasion, libel
remedies often were inadequate; libel suits compounded unwanted publicity and focused the trial on the issue of truth or
falsity of a damaging disclosure. 125 Libel doctrines also did
not reach new invasions of privacy made possible by advances
in photography in the late i88o's, such as the taking of "can119 See State v. Burnham, 9 N.H. 34, 42 (I837).
120

See, e.g., id. at 41; People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 337 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.

1804). See generally "The Greater the Truth, the Greater the Libel", 26 CAN. L.
TIMES 394, 394-95 (1906).
121 Territory v. Nugent, i Mart. xo8, iii (Terr. Orleans i8io); State v. Lehre, 4
S.C.L. (2Brev.) 446, 447-48 (18I1); Smith v. State, 32 Tex. 594, 597-98 (1870).
122 See A. HATCH, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES AND THE STATUTES OF ENGLAND ON LIBEL AND SLANDER (1895).
123 Respublica v. Dennie, 4 Yeates 267, 270 (Pa. 18o5) (the formulation

was
apparently originated by Alexander Hamilton); see Delaware State Fire & Marine Ins.
Co. v. Croasdale, ii Del. (6 Houst.) 181, 210-II (Super. Ct. 188o); Castle v. Houston,
ig Kan. 417, 428 (1877); Barthelmy v. People, 2 Hill 248, 259 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842);
Commonwealth v. Odell, 3 Pittsb. R. 449, 452 (Pa. Ct. Quar. Sess. 1867); cf. Commonwealth v. Damon, 136 Mass. 441, 447 (1884) (if truth is shown, state must prove
"actual malicious intention"); Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304,
314 (1826) (truth is a defense in the "public interests"); Commonwealth v. Clap, 4
Mass. 163, 169 (i8o8) ("justifiable purpose" is a defense, but truth is not).
124 State v. Bienvenu, 36 La. Ann. 378, 382 (2884); see Delaware State Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. Croasdale, ii Del. (6 Houst.) 181, 194-95 (Super Ct. 188o) ("[I]t
would be a gross abuse of the constitutional privilege of printing upon any subject,
to drag before the public the private character of a person, for the malicious purpose
of injuring or destroying it." (emphasis omitted)); Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20
Mass. (3 Pick.) 304, 312 (2826) ("No state of society would be more deplorable than
that which would admit an indiscriminate right in every citizen to arraign the conduct
of every other, before the public, in newspapers, handbills or other modes of publication, not only for crimes, but for faults, foibles, deformities of mind or person, even
admitting all such allegations to be true.").
125 See Godkin, Libel and Its Legal Remedy, 12 J. Soc. Sci. 69, 80, 82 (i88o).
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did" photographs without the subject's knowledge 126 and subsequent printing of these photos in newspapers. 127 Widespread
public dissatisfaction with the lack of effective legal recourse
led to many demands for improved remedies. 128 Just as "[n]ew
conditions both of law and customs were called for as safeguards against the collisions of railroads," wrote a university
president in 1884, it was time that "new defenses should be
set up in behalf of the individual" against "the omnipresent
press." 129
IV.

CONCLUSION

Newspaper disclosures of personal information were not
the only invasions of privacy to be remedied by nineteenth
century American law, nor the first to receive the law's attention. When Warren and Brandeis wrote in I89O, restraint of
the press was among the least developed areas of privacy
protection. The principle they invoked had been expressed by
E.L. Godkin in i88o:
[N]othing is better worthy of legal protection than private
life, or, in other words, the right of every man to keep his
affairs to himself, and to decide for himself to what extent
they shall be the subject of public observation and discussion.
* ' * The press has no longer anything to fear from legal
restriction of any kind, as regards its influence or material
prosperity; while the community has a good deal to fear from
what may be called excessive publicity, 13
or0 rather from the
loss by individuals of the right of privacy.
126 See A. WESTIN, supra note 14, at 172, 338; Speed, The Right of Privacy, 163
N. AM. REV. 64, 73 (i896); The Kodak Fiend, Boston Evening Transcript, June 2,
189o, at 6, col. 4.
127 See Manola v. Stevens, N.Y. Times, June 21, i89o, at 2, col. 2 (N.Y. Sup.

Ct. June 20, 289o); Photographed in Tights, N.Y. Times, June 15, 189o, at 2, col. 3;
Manola Gets an Injunction, N.Y. Times, June 18, 289o, at 3, col. 2. See also Moore
v. Rugg, 44 Minn. 28, 46 N.W. 141 (I89O) ("highly improper" use of photograph held
breach of implied contract by photographer); The PhotographicNuisance, 5o NATION
154 (I8go) (anticipates the Warren-Brandeis proposal); Liberty vs. License, N.Y.
Tribune, Jan. 26, 18go, at 6, col. 4 (verbal description as invasive as photographic
depiction).
128 See, e.g., Bascom, Public Press and Personal Rights, 4 EDUC. 604, 604-o5
(2884); Field, The Newspaper Press and the Law of Libel, 3 INT'L REV. 479, 484-86
(2876); Godkin, supra note 125, at 8o, 82; Godkin, The Rights of the Citizen. - IV.
To His Own Reputation, 8 SCRmNER'S MAGAZINE 58, 62-63, 67 (890); Proffatt,
The Law of Newspaper Libel, 232 N. AM. REV. 2o9, io, 121-22 (288o); The Law of
-

Libel, 48 NATION 173 (1889).
129 Bascom, supra note 228, at 604-05.
130 Godkin, supra note 125, at 8o, 82.
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Doctrines already well established protected personal privacy
more directly, so that no reporter could intrude upon the
domestic castle, read private letters, or obtain individual census data. In an effort to improve the legal remedy for publication of private matters, Warren and Brandeis needed to set
against the newspapers' jealously guarded first amendment
on the part of individuals, an
rights a countervailing right
13 1
explicit "right to privacy."
Did the many legal protections afforded to private property, confidential communications, and personal information
testify to the existence of a "right to privacy"? Certainly,
nineteenth century Americans thought so. Legal and popular
writers frequently invoked a right to privacy, 13 2 even a constitutional right to privacy, 133 before Warren and Brandeis
adopted the phrase. Courts and legislatures explicitly recognized that privacy was a legally protected interest. 134 The
HarvardLaw Review article by Warren and Brandeis, which
has been credited with so much, must be read against this
existing background of common law, constitutional, and statutory protection.
131 See note 16 supra.
132

See, e.g., M. GRAY, supra note 69, at 217; Godkin, supra note 125, at 82; The

Way It Ought Not to Be Collected, 9 NATION 453 (x869); Boston Sunday Globe, May
25, 289o, at i, cols. 6-8.
'33 See, e.g., J. BONHAM, RAILWAY SECRECY AND TRUSTS 38, 41 (I890); Book
9 PUB. OPINION 45 (1890).
Review,
34
1 See 0. HANDLIN & M. HANDLIN, THE DIMENSIONS OF LIBERTY 6o (ig6x)
(the right "was respected in advance of any direct protection'); A. WESTIN, supra
note 14, at 33o-38; G. WHITE, supra note 24, at 275 ("[Plrivacy became a significant
value in American society, beginning in the latter part of the nineteenth century.').

